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returned a verdict against Flynt and Hustler 
but not Flynt Distributing Co. Falwe/l, 
__ F.2d at __ . 
On appeal, the defendants made the con-
stitutional argument that since Falwell is a 
public figure, the "actual malice" standard 
of New York Times v. SuI/ivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964), must be met before he can re-
cover for emotional distress. In New York 
Times, the Supreme Court determined that 
libel actions brought by public officials 
against the press can have a chilling effect 
on the press, inconsistent with the first 
amendment. Therefore, when a public of-
ficial sues for libel based upon a tortious 
publication, the defendant is entitled to a 
degree of first amendment protection. Fal-
well, __ F.2d at __ . This protection 
was extended to cases in which the plain-
tiff is a public figure. Curtis Publishing 
Company v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
The court of appeals determined that 
"since Falwell is a public figure and the 
gravamen of the suit is a tortious publica-
tion, the defendants are entitled to the 
same level of first amendment protection 
in the claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress thllt they received in 
Falwell's claim for libel." Falwell, __ 
F.2d at __ . The court of appeals rea-
soned that "to hold otherwise would frus-
trate the intent of New York Times and en-
courage the type of self censorship which 
the Supreme Court sought to abolish." Id. 
at_._. 
The court of appeals determined that the 
issue then becomes what form the first 
amendment protection should take in an 
action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Flynt and Hustler argued 
that Falwell must prove that the advertise-
ment was published with " ... knowing 
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth," 
which is the "actual malice" standard of 
New York Times v. Sullivan. Id. at __ . 
Although the court agreed that the same 
level of protection is due the defendants, it 
did not believe that the literal application 
of the "actual malice" standard is appropri-
ate in an action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. !d. at __ . The court 
rationalized that when the "actual malice" 
standard is applied to a defamation action, 
no elements of the tort are altered. There-
fore, the "actual malice" standard merely 
increases the level of fault the plaintiff 
must prove in order to recover in an action 
based upon a publication. Id. at __ . If 
the plaintiff was required to prove the de-
fendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard of the truth in an action for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, it 
would add a new element to this tort and 
significantly alter its nature. !d. at __ . 
The court of appeals found that the New 
York Times standard was misread by the 
defendants because their argument em-
phasized the language "falsity or disregard 
for the truth." Properly read, New York 
Times focused on culpability, and the em-
phasis of the "actual malice" standard is 
"knowing ... or reckless." [d. at __ . 
The court of appeals analyzed the first of 
the four elements of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress under Virginia law, 
which requires that the defendant's mis-
conduct be intentional or reckless. This 
element is precisely the level of fault that 
New York Times requires in an action for 
defamation. !d. at __ . The court found 
that "the first amendment will not shield 
intentional or reckless misconduct result-
ing in damage to reputation, and neither 
should it shield such misconduct which 
results in severe emotional distress." Id. 
at __ . 
The court of appeals further held that 
when the first amendment requires the ap-
plication of the "actual malice" standard, 
the standard is met when the jury finds 
that the defendant's "intentional or reck-
less misconduct" has proximately caused 
the alleged injury. Here, the jury made 
such a finding and thus the constitutional 
standard was satisfied. Id. at __ . 
The Falwell decision clearly distinguishes 
recovery for emotional distress from recov-
ery for defamation under the New York 
Times standard and emphasizes that the 
"actual malice" standard focuses on the de-
fendant's alleged "intentional or reckless" 
conduct, not whether the plaintiff can prove 
the defendant's "knowledge of falsity or 
reckless disregard for the truth." 
- J. Russell Fentress IV 




Unkle v. Unkle: MARYLAND 
DEFINES MARITAL PROPERTY 
IN PERSONAL INJURY SUIT 
In Unkle v. Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 505 
A.2d 849 (1985), the Maryland Court of 
Appeals for the first time considered the 
issue of whether a spouse's inchoate per-
sonal injury claim which accrued during 
marriage was marital property within the 
contemplation of the Maryland Family 
Law Article's definition of marital prop-
erty. 
The facts of the case are uncontroverted. 
Gypsy Jo and William Edward Unkle were 
divorced a vinculo matrimonio on Novem-
ber 11, 1984, by the Circuit Court for 
Carroll County. In awarding marital prop-
erty to Gypsy Jo, the court also awarded 
her 20% of any monies received by William 
from a pending personal injury case stem-
ming from an injury received in August of 
1983. The court awarded the money on an 
"if, as and when paid basis." 
The parties were separated at the time of 
the accident. William resided with his 
parents and received no assistance from 
Gypsy. Although William had retained 
counsel to represent him in the personal 
injury case, no suit had been filed prior to 
the issuance of the divorce decree. 
William appealed the circuit court's de-
cision to the court of special appeals and 
the court of appeals granted certiorari 
prior to that courts consideration of the 
issue. 
The court first undertook to define the 
meaning of the word property, noting that 
the Maryland cases have generally given 
the word a very broad definition. Spe-
cifically, the court quoted Deering v. Deer-
ing, 292 Md. 115,437 A.2d 883 (1981), 
wherein the court defined property as 
"everything which has exchangeable value 
or goes to make up a man's wealth-every 
interest or estate which the law regards of 
sufficient value for judicial recognition." 
Unkle, 305 Md. at 590. 
In Deering, the court recognized that a 
spouse's unmatured, fully vested pension 
rights were a form of marital property sub-
ject to equitable distribution under the 
Maryland statute. The court concluded 
that a spouse's pension right, "to the extent 
accumulated during the marriage", was a 
form of marital property and subject to 
distribution. The court specifically noted 
that a pension right was a contract right, 
derived from the terms of an employment 
contract. The court noted that a contract 
right is "Not an expectancy but a chose in 
action, a form of property." Id. at 591. 
In addition, the court noted that in 
Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347,493 A.2d 
1074 (1985), it held that a professional de-
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gree did not constitute marital property 
under § 8-201(e) of the Maryland Marital 
Property Act since it had "no exchange 
value on the open market." Id. at 591. 
The court then turned its attention to 
the instant issue, noting first that various 
courts have considered the same issue with 
varying results. The court undertook a 
case by case analysis of the question. The 
court noted that while some courts have 
completely rejected the argument that a 
personal injury award or settlement is 
marital property, other courts have con-
cluded that a personal injury case which is 
pending at the time of divorce cannot be 
marital property because ofits speculative 
nature. 
While the court was obviously swayed 
by this argument, and relied heavily on it, 
it is specious. The court has already al-
lowed a nonvested pension right to be di-
vided on a percentage basis, see Deer£ng v. 
Deer£ng, supra at 891, and there is no rea-
son why the same argument could not be 
applied here. 
The court then turned its attention to a 
series of New Jersey cases which have ad-
dressed the issue. In D£Tolvo v. D£Tolvo, 
131 N.J. Super. 72, 328 A.2d 625 (1974), 
the court held that potential damages in a 
personal injury case which occurred dur-
ing marriage was a chose in action and, as 
such, constituted marital property acquired 
by the spouse during marriage and was 
subject to equitable distribution upon dis-
solution of the marriage. D£Tolvo was af-
firmed in Landwehr v. Landwehr, 200 N.J. 
Super. 56, 490 A.2d 342 (1985). 
Reaching a contrary decision was Amato 
v. Amato, 180 N.J. Super. 210,434 A.2d 
639 (1981), another New Jersey inter-
mediate appellate court case. Amato in-
volved a spouse's unliquidated claim for 
damages stemming from a medical mal-
practice case. The court concluded that 
the damages were "peculiar to the injured 
person, to seek to be restored or made 
whole as he was before the injury." 434 
A.2d at 642. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the monies "represent personal 
property of the injured spouse, not dis-
tributable under the New Jersey Marital 
Property Statute." Id. at 643. The court 
carved out an exception, however, for 
losses which diminish the size of the mar-
ital estate, i.e. lost wages and medical ex-
penses, holding that such monies were "dis-
tributable when recovered." Id. at 644. 
The Supreme Court of Washington, in 
Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 
P. 2d 1207 (1984), gave a more concise ex-
planation of the above rationale when it 
stated: 
The physical injury to the spouse, and 
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the pain and suffering of the spouse 
therefrom is an injury to the spouse 
as an individual ... but on the other 
hand, if the injury deprives the marital 
community of the earnings or services 
of the spouse, that is an injury to the 
marital community. 
The court of appeals noted that Wash-
ington, unlike Maryland, is a community 
property state, but stated that the basic 
premise is the same: the focus is on the 
costs incurred by the couple and whether 
they reduced the size of the marital estate. 
The court of appeals then turned its at-
tention to the Maryland case law analyzing 
the Marital Property Statute, as well as the 
Report of the Governor's Commission on 
Domestic Relations Law (1978). After not-
ing that the statute and case law call for the 
court to consider both the monetary and 
nonmonetary contributions when distrib-
uting property in a divorce, and that the 
property rights of the spouses' be adjusted 
fairly and equitably, the court noted that 
the commission report explicitly noted 
that the theory of equitable distribution is 
that each spouse has a duty "to contribute 
his or her best efforts to the marriage for 
the benefit of the family unit." 305 Md. 
at 587. 
Given the above language, the court 
goes on to announce its holding in the in-
stant case. In one paragraph the court 
states that since the claim was not "ac-
quired" during the marriage, and arose by 
purely fortuitous circumstances . . . 
the claim is simply not the type of re-
source contemplated by the statutory 
definition of marital property even 
though, in part at least, payment of the 
claim would produce monies which 
would replenish marital assets previ-
ously diminished through payment of 
medical expenses and the loss of wages. 
Id. at 587 
In announcing such a broad reaching de-
cision the court of appeals has gone further 
than most courts which have come down 
on the same side of the issue. In Maryland, 
according to the court, not even lost wages 
or medical expenses which were originally 
paid out of the marital estate may be re-
plenished by an award from a personal in-
jury case. 
Given the facts of the instant case, i.e. 
that the parties were separated at the time 
of the accident, and that the wife incurred 
none of the expenses of the accident, the 
court probably reached an equitable deci-
sion. However, the court could have ac-
complished this without dealing with the 
more complex issue presented here by rul-
ing that under § 8-205 (8) of the Maryland 
Family Law Article that Gypsy had not 
contributed to this specific piece of marital 
property. In addition, § 8-205 (10) allows 
the court to consider "any other factor that 
the court considers necessary or appropri-
ate to consider in order to arrive at a fair 
and equitable monetary award." 
The court has left us with what may be a 
classic example of bad facts making bad 
law. By expanding its decision as far as it 
did, the court may have reached a decision 
that will be difficult to reconcile given dif-
ferent facts. One can picture a scenario 
wherein a spouse is injured while living 
with his/her husband/wife and expends 
great sums of otherwise marital property 
during the recovery process. By delaying 
settlement in the personal injury case, the 
injured spouse could conceivably deplete 
marital funds and later receive a windfall. 
Given the previous case law in the area, 
this does not appear to be a result the court 
of appeals would desire. 
- W£lHam Cassara 
Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.: 
INSURANCE COMPANIES' 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
WITH ATTORNEY CONTINGENCY 
FEE CONTRACTS: A BROADER 
RULE 
In Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mob£le Insurance Co., 306 Md. 754, 511 
A.2d 492 (1986) the Maryland Court of 
Appeals, reversing the court of special ap-
peals, held, in a case of first impression, 
that an attorney stated a cause of action 
against an insurer for tortious interference 
with contract by alleging that the insurer 
had capitalized on his client's need for 
money by involving the client in settlement 
negotiations. 
The client, Donald Zorbach, was in-
volved in an automobile accident with 
another automobile insured by State Farm 
and suffered personal injuries. Zorbach re-
tained Ronald M. Sharrow as his attorney 
where, pursuant to a written agreement, 
Sharrow was to receive a specified per-
centage upon settlement or a slightly 
greater percentage ifsuit was filed. During 
his representation by Sharrow, Zorbach ran 
into serious financial difficulties and re-
quested that Sharrow advance him money. 
Sharrow declined stating that it is unethi-
cal for an attorney to advance money to his 
client and also stated that it would be un-
wise to approach State Farm with a similar 
request. Against his attorney's advice and 
without his knowledge, Zorbach contacted 
State Farm and requested an advance on 
